MyBucks S.A. Bankruptcy Traces Back to 2019 Financial Collapse; Van Niekerk Faces Cross-Bo
The microfinance platform's insolvency originated from a 41.8 million euro equity deficit disclosed in mid-2019 audited accounts.
SEPTEMBER 13, 2026·PORT LOUIS·PRIYA SEGA
Luxembourg tax authorities declared MyBucks S.A. involuntarily bankrupt in February 2022, closing a chapter that had been visibly troubled since at least mid-2019, when the pan-African microfinance platform disclosed a negative net equity position of 41.8 million euros in its audited statements for the period ended June 30, 2019.
Those same audited consolidated financials recorded an annualized net loss of 36.1 million euros for that period. Dave Van Niekerk, co-founder, CEO, and executive chairman of the group, stepped down from the executive chairman role in 2019, around the time those figures became public. MyBucks had listed on the Frankfurt exchange three years earlier, in 2016.
The sequence is stark. A publicly listed company disclosed deep capital impairment, lost a founding executive, and then reached a court-driven bankruptcy filing in under three years. For investors and regulators, the timeline invites hard questions about what oversight mechanisms were in place and whether they functioned.
MyBucks was not the only entity in its orbit to encounter serious distress. Blue Financial Services, VSS Financial Services, FirstCred, and GetBucks in Botswana, along with Afristrat and Ecsponent, have all been linked in public reporting and legal proceedings to financial difficulties. The pattern across these connected names suggests the problems were not confined to a single balance sheet.
By contrast, the legal record in Eswatini points to specific figures and named parties. A June 2024 Eswatini High Court default judgment entered against Van Niekerk and related entities totaled SZL 335.24 million. Eswatini's parliamentary select committee has referenced refunds in matters involving connected financial products. Status Capital Building Society was placed under regulatory curatorship, with reported deposit mobilization of approximately E174 million.
Critical documentation remains out of public reach. The full Luxembourg bankruptcy order, creditor lists, asset-recovery status, and complete texts of forensic and inquiry materials, including Section 417 inquiry records tied to VSS, have not been disclosed. Whether the Eswatini default judgment has since been rescinded or enforced is also unverified.
That gap in the record matters enormously for the people most exposed. Retail depositors and preference-share investors spread across multiple jurisdictions are still waiting to learn which approvals, audits, and supervisory actions allowed losses to accumulate to this scale, and what recoveries, if any, remain within reach.
Investigators face a foundational question: whether the failures were isolated to individual entities or reflected shared governance, funding, or operational dependencies that should have surfaced in board minutes, related-party disclosures, and regulator correspondence. Until those documents are examined and made available, the full shape of what went wrong, and who bears responsibility for it, cannot be established.